What Russia Really Wants

If we go back to the Mueller Report, we can see the outline of what Putin really wants in Ukraine. TL;DR, Be prepared for continued conflict until Russian regime change.

If the Russian climbdown is real—and with the additional caveat that there’s much we don’t know about the state of negotiations—then Kyiv must still be leery that Putin does not turn such a deal to his long-term advantage. It is worth considering the lessons of one previously aborted peace initiative when thinking about how Ukraine can prevent an unfavorable outcome now. That proposal, which would have benefited Putin significantly, came from a Russian spy who tried to get former President Donald Trump to endorse his plan. Looking at the contours of that draft initiative shows the sort of concessions that should be avoided now if at all possible

Over the course of many months from 2016 to 2018, though, Kilimnik sought to use Manafort’s position in Trump’s orbit to influence U.S. policy and push what Kilimnik described in emails as a Russia-endorsed plan to end the conflict in Ukraine, seemingly to Putin’s advantage. During a key August 2016 meeting at which Manafort gave campaign polling data to Kilimnik (who then allegedly passed it on to Russia), the two men discussed that possible “peace plan.” As the Mueller report described it:

Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region of Donbas, and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic. That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a “backdoor” means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.

Manafort lost his job before getting a chance to push his boss to help implement it as president. But we know that Kilimnik pressed Manafort about it for months after that meeting, even after Trump took office and Manafort was already under indictment for his work in Ukraine.

Also from the Mueller report:

Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an email to Manafort expressing the view—which Manafort later said he shared—that the plan’s success would require U.S. support to succeed: “all that is required to start the process is a very minor ‘wink’ (or slight push) from [Donald Trump].” The email also stated that if Manafort were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his reception in Russia “at the very top level.”

The outlines of the plan had three parts. First, the plan called for the “creation” of the “Autonomous Republic of Donbass” that would be formed “within the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts that existed prior to April 2014, when the armed conflict began.” Those borders include more than 10 percent of Ukraine’s population, a vast amount of the country’s agricultural land and natural resources, and many of the cities now under siege and assault by Russian forces. It also includes the town of Mariupol, which has been devastated by Russian bombardment of civilians and is home to a crucial port. Kilimnik even named his proposal the “Mariupol plan.” The second element of the plan involved Ukraine incorporating this “autonomous republic” into its own body politic via a parliamentary vote that would grant the area “reintegration” into the Ukraine and its own political representation in the country. The “Autonomous Republic of Donbass” (ARD) would thus have influence over Ukraine’s political affairs. The third and final point of the plan would grant the region its own prime minister, who would be “a legitimate and plenipotentiary representative of ARD in talks with international structures.”

The key to the entire plan, which would give a Russian quisling control over a key region and ability to influence Ukrainian domestic and foreign affairs, was Trump’s endorsement. Kilimnik wrote:

Personal participation of the US President will lead to stopping the bloodshed, returning political balance and stability in Ukraine, creating a stable and effective pro-European legislative majority, able of implementing effective reforms.

As things stand, Russians still have not gained control of Mariupol, nor most other major Ukrainian cities. But if Putin won’t settle for anything less than something like the “Mariupol plan,” Ukraine could be in for more turmoil, even should Russia officially withdraw its forces and leave Ukraine, on paper, with the borders it had before this war.